Abstract. Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b ∈ [h] n , has expected profit E[P (b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of
Introduction
For our good fortune, we were hired to design a mechanism for handling the upcoming 'world cup' TV broadcasts. We are given a two sided communication with the (numerous) potential costumers, the marginal cost for adding one viewer is negligible, and our primary goal is to maximize our revenue. The classical approach for maximizing the revenue on scenarios like this is to set up a fixed price, and charge it from any viewer. However, the price can be fixed too high, causing a smaller number of viewers, or too low, causing a low price collecting from each viewer. Either way, the overall revenue might be too low.
This motivates the study of an unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auction. These auctions can guarantee a revenue which is a constant approximation to the best single price revenue (which is not necessarily known). In this paper we study the derandomization of such truthful auctions. Goldberg et al. [5] introduced randomized auctions that achieve on expectation a constant fraction approximation of the optimal single price revenue. 1 They named these auctions competitive after the notion of competitive analysis of online algorithms. They also proved that randomization is essential assuming the auction is symmetric (that is, assuming the outcome of the auction does not depend on the order of the input bids). Aggarwal et al. [1] later showed how to construct from any randomized auction a deterministic, asymmetric auction with approximately the same revenue. More accurately, given a randomized auction A which accepts bid-vectors in [1, h] n , they constructed a deterministic, asymmetric auction In this paper we show that in the case where the bid-vectors come from [h] n , one can improve the construction of A D above so as to guarantee a better lower bound for P A D (b), for the cases where
Formally we prove the following.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be outlined roughly as follows. Given a randomized auction A, we first define a distribution over a set of deterministic auctions. We then show that if we choose a deterministic auction
for every bid-vector b (where the expectancy on the left-hand side is w.r.t. the choice of A D and the expectancy on the right-hand side is w.r.t. the coin tosses of A). In addition to that, our distribution has the property that the event
depends on a relatively few number of other events Bad b . Moreover, for every b, we have that the probability of Bad b is sufficiently small. We then apply the Lovász Local Lemma to show that there exists a choice for A D for which none of the events Bad b occur. For our choice of t, this will give the theorem.
We stress the fact that the result of Aggarwal et al. [1] is more general in the sense that it deals with bid-vectors in [1, h] n , while Theorem 1 only deals with discrete bid-vectors. Still, discrete bid-vectors make more sense in real life auctions, where for example, bids are being made in Dollars and Cents. We also note that the construction used in the proof of Theorem 1 is not polynomial time computable and that this is also the case in the construction of Aggarwal et al. [1] .
Definition 1 (Unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auction). An unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auction is a mechanism in which there is one item of unlimited supply to sell by an auctioneer to n bidders. The bidders place bids for the item according to their valuation of the item. The auctioneer then sets prices for every bidder. If the price for a bidder is lower than or equal to its bid, then the bidder is considered as a winner and gets to buy the item for its price. A bidder with price higher than its bid does not pay nor gets the item. The auctioneer's profit is the sum of the winners prices. A truthful auction is an auction in which every bidder bids its true valuation for the item. It is well known that truthfulness can be achieved through bid-independent auctions (see for example [4] ). A bid-independent auction is an auction for which the auctioneer computes the price for bidder i using only the vector b −i (that is, without the ith bid).
A structural lemma
Let A be a randomized truthful auction that accepts bid-vectors from 
One can define the following randomized auction A , which is equivalent to the above randomized auction A with respect to expected profits. First, A maintains the exact same list of functions as A. On a bid-vector b ∈ [h] n , the auction performs the following independently for every i ∈ [n]: it tosses the same coins that A does, chooses accordingly an integer j ∈ [m] and then offers the ith bidder price g i,j (b −i ). The expected profit of A on input b is given by:
We call A the bidder-self-randomness-dual of A. The following clearly follows from the discussion above.
Lemma 1. Let A be a randomized auction and A be its bidder-selfrandomness-dual auction. Then A and A have the same expected profit on every bid-vector.
Probabilistic Tools
The proof of Theorem 1 makes use of the Lovász Local Lemma [3] . We need the following version of the lemma [2] .
Lemma 2 (The local lemma; symmetric case). Let Bad i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , be events in an arbitrary probability space. Suppose that each event Bad i is mutually independent of a set of all the other events Bad j but at most d, and that
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, then Pr[
Let X be the average of n independent random variables X i , where X i ∈ [a i , b i ] for all i. We will need the following inequality [6] : 2 
Proof of Theorem 1
Let A be a randomized auction which accepts bid-vectors in [h] n . Let {g i,j : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]} be the set of functions that A maintains. We construct a deterministic auction A D . To do that, we first define a certain tripartite graph G = (Lft, Cntr , Rght, E). Using this tripartite graph, we define a distribution over deterministic auctions. We will then obtain a deterministic auction A D by choosing an auction at random according to that distribution. The proof of Theorem 1 will follow by showing that A D satisfies the conclusion in the theorem with positive probability.
We first describe the tripartite graph G. We let Lft be the set of all nh n−1 vectors b −i , where b ∈ [h] n is a bid-vector and i ∈ [n]. We let Cntr be the set of all pairs {(b −i , g i,j (b −i )) : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}. We let
